Topic: Steve Schneider

Experts and behavioral scientists evaluated the risk of mass suicide at the Waco compound, finding contradictory evidence. While David Koresh and Steve Schneider publicly claimed suicide was against their religion, FBI experts identified it as a significant risk. Most behavioral scientists eventually agreed that further negotiations would not result in a large-scale exodus of the remaining followers.

Paul Fatta details his growing interest in the prophecies of the Book of Revelation, which led him to connect with Steve Schneider. Despite running a successful business with 75 employees, Fatta traveled from Hawaii to Texas to meet David Koresh directly. He describes his first impressions of Koresh and a subsequent 13-hour Bible study session that he found transformative.

The FBI used flashbang grenades to prevent Branch Davidians from collecting rainwater in the courtyard starting April 7, 1993. On Good Friday, April 9, Steve Schneider received permission to light incense canisters, but the FBI simultaneously decided they would not fight any fires that might develop. That same evening, Schneider was targeted with a flashbang grenade while attempting to speak with agents near a tank.

The reading of the deceased continues with victims from Canada, Argentina, Israel, and New Zealand. Specific mention is made of David Koresh's wife, Rachel, and their children, Cyrus, Star, and Bobby Lane. The Martin family suffered extensive losses, including Wayne Martin and several children, while key figures like Steve and Judy Schneider also died in the fire.

The discussion reviews the status of various individuals associated with Mount Carmel, including those who left during the 51-day standoff and those arrested while trying to enter the property. Doyle describes how David Koresh and Steve Schneider negotiated the release of 30 people, mostly children, early in the siege. He contrasts this with the increasing hostility of the tactical teams who used barbed wire and flashbang grenades to intimidate those remaining inside.

Doyle recounts a recorded phone call where negotiators told Steve Schneider to get fire insurance after asking about fire extinguishers. He describes instances where federal agents threw flashbang grenades at Davidians during agreed-upon rendezvous, illustrating a "good cop, bad cop" dynamic between negotiators and tactical teams.

The discussion covers the Davidians' initial naivety regarding the search warrant and the subsequent breakdown in trust as they watched their friends being jailed on TV. Doyle highlights Koresh's frustration with negotiators who claimed they were "peons" overruled by bosses in Washington.

Rod Engleman questions whether the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) initiated the Mount Carmel raid as a publicity stunt to secure funding from the Senate Budget Committee. He cites a discrepancy in an affidavit regarding the Los Angeles riots and shares an anecdote about Steve Schneider attempting to contact him via a jury-rigged cellular phone before the final fire.

Attorney Jack Zimmerman recounts his personal interactions with Steve and Judy Schneider inside the Mount Carmel Center, describing them as educated, decent people rather than the "monsters" portrayed by the media. He details the spartan conditions they endured, including a lack of running water, and notes Judy's decision to stay with her child despite an infected hand wound.

Negotiations toward the end of the siege involved David Koresh agreeing to surrender once he finished writing his interpretation of the Seven Seals of Revelation. While the group managed resources like MREs and rainwater, the FBI reportedly insisted that any exit be strictly orchestrated over phone lines to avoid sniper fire. Despite the progress on the manuscript, the final assault involving tanks began on April 19, 1993.

As the siege neared its end, federal agents increased psychological pressure by demanding residents stay away from windows and the tower. During a recorded phone call, a negotiator asked Steve Schneider if the group had fire extinguishers; when Schneider confirmed they had only one, the negotiator reportedly told him to "get some fire insurance." This exchange is viewed by survivors as evidence that the government anticipated or planned the subsequent fire.

Survivors admit to an initial naivety, believing they would simply sit on the lawn while agents searched the building and then return inside. However, as the siege progressed, any resident who stepped outside was met with aggression. Steve Schneider, David Jones, and Pablo Cohen were reportedly targeted with flashbang grenades during agreed-upon rendezvous or while performing maintenance tasks like digging waste pits.