A Waco FBI Report News Briefing Part 1 Of 2 [bCBfUC5ZOp0]

00:01 ♪♪ ♪♪ An unexpurgated copy of the documents you have was deposited this morning with the federal court in Waco where 11 Branch Davidian defendants are scheduled to go on trial in January. Much of the last few days has been spent by me and a variety of others

01:05 trying in every way we can imagine to make the material that was struck from your versions available to you. The problem is that a federal statute, 18 USC section 2517 limits our ability to make that available I am particularly concerned by that because some of it is frankly newsworthy will be of public interest but the statute is there and allows its release only as part of the court process at Waco or under subpoena and under oath before a congressional committee. We very much hope that this material will be available to you in, at the earliest possible time. Now I'd like to give you Mr Ed Dennis. I'd like to preface

02:18 my remarks about the report that you have in front of you by stating that as a lawyer and as a prosecutor, and as one who has dealt with cases in court over the years I have tried to be as objective and as fair-minded in the judgments I have made as I could muster. And I've tried to stay relatively detached and unemotional about the subject matter that was before me, feeling that would achieve the best professional result. I must confess that in this instance it is very difficult not to be drawn in emotionally to the fabric of what has occurred. Four ATF agents have been murdered. Children have been executed perhaps by their own parents

03:28 men, women and children have been burned beyond recognition. The ambush by David Koresh and the siege that followed at Mount Carmel have taken off in a horrific toll thus I approach this assignment with some trepidation one cannot be completely dispassionate in the midst of such bloodshed the spectacle of children's lives bartered like pieces of silver

04:05 by a twisted mind will haunt me and the others involved in this matter for the rest of our lives. How could seemingly intelligent people pursue a course of such insane consequence? I know not, I have no answer to that question. I'm not a religious scholar nor am i a behavioral expert but I was asked by the Deputy Attorney General to use my best judgment to evaluate the handling of the incident

04:44 by those of which we ask so much, the men and women of law enforcement. I have attempted to frame the more mundane issues raised by this matter and I have concluded as follows. The fire which occurred on April 19th was not caused by a tear gas assault. I think that the evidence is overwhelming both the evidence that has been revealed in the reports today as well as other evidence which will probably be made public shortly

05:21 is overwhelming that the fire was started by those within the compound. The tear gas plan was carefully conceived in order to reduce the risk of fire, a particular tear gas and way of delivering it was specifically selected in order to reduce the risk of fire. Concern about fire was not ignored there was fire equipment

05:58 which was held in the rear position but could not be brought up forward because of the danger to the firefighters. But it seems clear from the evidence that the fire was not a product of the tear gas assault, To the contrary, the fire appears to be an act of mass suicide or an act of mass murder or a combination of the two

06:35 The evidence seems to be clear that David Koresh had before the tear gas assault laid plans to set fire to the compound. It is not clear that was a group decision, it is not clear that those inside the compound were prepared to give up their lives. The medical examiners report shows that a number of individuals were shot in the back, a number of individuals died not from the fire but from gunshot wounds. Most of those gunshot wounds were to their head but a number of those gunshot wounds were to the chest and other areas up the body and a number of children died not from the fire but from gunshot wounds to the head one child was apparently

07:42 Stabbed to death this standoff took place over 51 days during that 51 day period from the time that The ceasefire took place between ATF and the branch Davidians not one Gun was fired. Not one round was fired by law enforcement By the FBI into the compound and that includes April 19th

08:22 as the armored vehicles moved forward to insert the tear gas into the compound. Further, warnings were given to those inside the compound by loudspeaker that this was a non-lethal assault, that this was a tear gas assault. Every effort was made to communicate to those inside the compound that this was a non lethal assault for two reasons first of all

08:59 so that those that wanted to exit would not fear being shot by law enforcement if they left the compound. Second, in order to make clear to those inside that this was not an armed confrontation and that they might have thought was a prophetic event which required them to engage in a suicidal armed engagement with law enforcement Unfortunately, those efforts did not result in a mass exodus from the compound. Nine individuals left the compound—a number apparently reluctantly. One FBI agent who was inside his armored vehicle left the safety of that vehicle realizing that four fellow law enforcement agents

09:57 had been killed by gunfire from the compound, realizing that gunfire had erupted from the compound as the armored vehicles have moved into position and attempted to rescue a young woman who was somewhat deliriously moving from the compound out into an open area. When she was seen by the agent she ran back into the compound and threw herself into a burning portion of it The agent went into the compound and physically, with her resisting pulled her from the compound and put her into the vehicle. She did survive now the negotiations...the second focus of my report has been on the negotiations and the negotiation strategy which was implemented to attempt to resolve the confrontation without further loss of life

11:00 There was a negotiation strategy. It was a coherent strategy, it was one that was backed up by an extraordinary amount of research and intelligence the Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms did an extraordinary job in gathering information about the Branch Davidians and about David Koresh the behavioral scientists within the Bureau and those that were brought in as outside consultants, were given access to the information. They evaluated it, evaluated some of the early negotiations and developed an assessment of David Koresh and the situation as they believed it to be within the compound. That assessment and those assessments

11:54 were in hindsight extraordinarily accurate. the risk of a mass suicide was clearly something that the Bureau was aware of. Indeed, ATF was aware of the risk of mass suicide because I think as The Treasury Report states one of the reasons for not initially opting for a siege of the compound was the concern about mass suicide David Koresh's objectives and so far as his scriptural interpretations were concerned in his prophecies Were evaluated and I believe accurately So based upon how the situation resolved itself. The negotiation strategy was to try to accomplish a number of objectives one was to try to convince

12:52 David Koresh and the Davidians that this was not an apocalyptic confrontation, and that therefore this need not result in their deaths. The other objective was to try to convince David Koresh that he might be able to successfully meet criminal charges that he was well aware would be brought against him and perhaps others in the compound for the murders of the four ATF agents. It's important to keep in mind that David Koresh had been charged with criminal charges, he and other members of the Branch Davidian back in 1987, and he had successfully been able to survive those charges

13:51 And Sheriff Harwell, who was a part of the negotiation team did involve himself in the negotiations. He was involved in that earlier case and so an effort was made to convince Koresh that he could survive this particular event and perhaps come out of it with a larger following or with a stronger leadership. And finally there was an attempt to divide Koresh from the rest of his following by demonstrating that, in fact this was not the prophetic confrontation that Koresh had preached and also by through showing that the FBI had control of the situation perhaps having his followers lose confidence in him. The

14:51 The criticism that I have made with regard to the approach to that strategy relates to a conflict between that strategy and certain pressure tactics which were used at the compound in order to put, to raise the level of anxiety within the compound as well as to raise the level of discomfort within the compound. I want to put that in context First, it is not my judgment that if the negotiation strategy had been followed more rigorously that the situation would have resolved itself in a manner different than it finally ended. I believe the negotiators were of the opinion that perhaps they might have been able to orchestrate the release or the exit of more Davidians

15:49 35 individuals, men women and children exited the compound over the 51 day period. That was certainly a direct result of the efforts of the negotiators in dealing with Koresh I believe and I believe the negotiators believe as well as as the tactical elements that Koresh was not coming out. Koresh stated on a number of occasions that he knew he was facing the death penalty He even joked on one occasion that when they gave him the lethal injection, he wanted to be given the cheap stuff. So that I believe any suggestion that we have an answer as to how this situation would've been resolved without loss of life is the purest speculation and would be totally irresponsible but our objective here is to look at the procedures that were followed

16:54 look at the approach that was followed to see in hindsight whether or not there were some aspects that might have been carried out differently. That's one aspect that I think might have been carried out differently, behavioral experts whom I believe are most accurate in assessing Koresh's state of mind and the state of mind of those within the compound asked that an approach be followed which was somewhat unorthodox I think everyone recognizes within law enforcement that it's a combination of pressure tactics as well as the negotiations used in tandem that are ordinarily used to resolve situations like this one. However, because David Koresh seemed to be inviting this confrontation in order to fulfill his prophecy and his vision of himself

17:55 a religious martyr who was coming to or whose death would bring about a sequence of apocalyptic events that the only way in which to effectively reduce Koresh's power over his following was really to withdraw in terms of the hardware and to try to change the face the law enforcement presence insofar as those inside the compound were concerned. In face of the fact that there were four agents killed in the attempt to serve the warrants on February 28th and 20 agents or perhaps more injured in that attempt plus the extraordinary amount of armament within the compound

18:52 the training of the Davidians to use that armament, their willingness to use that armament. To have removed a substantial amount of the firepower that law enforcement had at its disposal to a greater distance would certainly have been an extraordinary decision however I think that in terms of future operations If the elements are there that were present in this situation, then at least something along those lines might have been pursued initially and if the results were not favorable the tactical presence could have been increased at a later time. Again this is in hindsight

19:43 I do not consider this to be a gross error in judgment and i do not consider that if though that strategy were followed, that necessarily more would have exited or that the entire situation would have been resolved without bloodshed. In fact there is evidence to suggest that those that did exit the compound, did not exit because they were defecting from Koresh but that they exited at Koresh's direction and as a result of a timetable he had in mind with regard to how he might be able to bring this entire confrontation to a quote magnificent end in his mind. As one of the behavioral experts stated

20:33 The FBI was not hesitant to employ the services of not only its own internal behavioral scientists, but those from outside. It was not hesitant to take the advice and consider the advice of religious experts that certainly did factor into the approach here. Unfortunately it was unavailing and in my belief it was unavailing because Koresh's unique brand of theology was so unorthodox that there was really no common ground that I could see between Orthodox religious beliefs and those that he was espousing, particularly since they all seem to be bound up in his unique personality. Finally my report deals with the decision-making process

21:29 to go forward with the tear gas plan on April 19th. I find no fault with the decision-making process, the Attorney General exercised extraordinary oversight insofar as questioning the plan, the type of gas that would be used, the effect that that gas might have on younger occupants of the compound alternatives were considered There was an extraordinary period of deliberation. Negotiators were consulted at length with regard to their view that negotiations would no longer prove fruitful, the plan was developed to take place over a number of hours in fact the initial tear gas insertion took place at six in the morning or began at six in the morning and of course as we know the fire erupted almost 6 hours later

22:29 Certainly in terms of a reasonable Alternatives those were considered. I believe that the tear gas Assault was the appropriate Decision to make it certainly would be a decision that I think I would make in that situation The execution of the gas plan at the teargas plant as I have described it is was carried out according to plan. There was one departure and that was that the decision was made to breach the walls of the compound in order to give an opportunity for those inside, to escape. The feeling being that perhaps some were trying to leave the compound but because of the barricades were unable to physically do so

23:25 I find that this was a reasonable departure from the plan. In fact, the arson experts found that there were means of access into the...of leaving the compound created by the breaching of the walls of the compound. The fact that Moore did not exit, I think is a function of the state-of-mind of those inside the compound and not a result of intimidation by law enforcement Finally, I want to conclude by recognizing that we all expect a great deal of law enforcement. We expect decisiveness and we expect restraint. We expect action and at the same time we expect empathy. We expect toughness and at the same time but we expect compassion

24:20 We demand a great deal of law enforcement. We expect all of these things and perhaps we even expect prescience I find that there is no place in the evaluation for blame And I find no fault in the performance Of law enforcement during the standoff and the tear gas assault Koresh, and the Davidians were handled with patience restraint and understanding. Certainly as much patience, restraint and understanding as could be expected under the circumstances. The tear gas plan was not the wrong decision there was no rush to judgment here There were alternatives and they were considered but in my view any judgment that the alternatives would have altered the final outcome is the purest speculation although in hindsight there were some mistakes made

25:29 I don't believe there were gross errors in judgment, nor were they the product of any motivation other than to resolve the crisis without further loss of life. Ultimately the outcome was not within the power of law enforcement to affect David Koresh held the fate of his followers in his hands In the end being unsuccessful and maneuvering law enforcement To bring about the prophetic martyrdom he sought In a last and fatal act of manipulation, he choreographed his own death and the deaths of most of his followers. This was the final act of a man who held himself out to be God." The final request of the Attorney General was to make recommendations for the future—to use this as an occasion to look not only at the very peculiar unusual circumstances in Texas

26:45 but more broadly at our capacity for handling what I call complex hostage barricade situations. Those are situations where either the number of highly armed people resisting arrest, search law enforcement or the number of hostages they hold make the problem extremely dangerous very important to handle, and one that requires very complicated sets of resources. I may call those simply complex hostage barricade situations. They...I want you to be uh... To understand me you have to recognize two things before i go any further there are many hostage barricades situations that take place in the United States in a year

27:42 They generally involve small numbers of people and few hostages. These are handled either by SWAT teams of local police departments or by SWAT teams of federal agencies. SWAT teams are carefully trained, dynamic entry that means willing to use force able to act very quickly but the SWAT teams are trained often two or three or four days a month not every day in the month, nor are they very large. The other thing that's important to recognize as I go on is that we have in the United States a separate capacity well organized well put together for events that endanger Americans hostage events that take place overseas what the Attorney General asked me to look at is what preparations do we need? What changes do we need for such events taking place in the United States

28:45 Let me begin by giving you an overview because the whole situation seems to me to fit rather nicely together and be quite comprehensible if you start with an overview. When faced with a number of well-armed people unwilling to submit to law enforcement or, a smaller number holding a number hostages what we need, what any country needs is a combination for capacities We need a highly trained, remarkably athletic rescue capacity. A superb group of people who can accomplish the rescue if you need it. We need an equally highly trained not surprisingly smaller number of negotiators because every such event involves both the possibility of assault by government rescue team

29:51 or preferably a negotiated solution. Third, we need social science knowledge available to us the prospects of negotiation and what the response will be to an assault, the very things that Mr Dennis was just talking about in Waco depend on understanding the people you're dealing with and that means we need to build that capacity in Finally, we need a crisis management structure

30:29 that allows us to orchestrate those capacities, negotiation, rescue knowledge about social science in a very complicated surprising dangerous situation. Beyond that there are other things we need but I'm not going to emphasize them for this type of event we have to have established relations with intelligence and ability to gather information and ability to deal with the press We need access, rapid access to the Defense Department when we need equipment. We need auxiliary law enforcement forces who can keep others from wandering into the scene of danger but I'm going to be concentrating on the four basic requirements as i describe what i think we have to do there's an easy starting place The only highly trained uh superbly conditioned and

31:35 world-class rescue team we have in the United States is the hostage rescue team for domestic events, is the hostage rescue team of the FBI at Quantico. It is our experts agree absolutely world class that is reassuring and good to know The FBI also has the negotiation capacities, the ability to train all which make it so obvious as to seem to me, almost undebatable that if we're only going to have one such capacity it oughta be the FBI. We're talking about a capacity to deal with unusually dangerous events, events that take place quite infrequently. We only need one and the FBI is the organization that is furthest along very well along in developing it. So what I'm about to describe is what we need

32:36 in an FBI capacity to deal with these extremely dangerous situations where well-armed people, in sizable numbers or holding sizeable numbers of hostages are resisting law enforcement. First the rescue team I've already said that our experts say they are world class Our experts also say we have too few We have 50 members of the hostage rescue team The experts say we need at least twice that many There are plans already underway to move to 75. I recommend that we move to the figure the experts recommend as a minimum, 100, as quickly as possible. That number both takes care of problems of fatigue it takes care of problems of the largest events

33:29 which could require more than 50, would require more than 50 people. It takes care of the problem that two events may purposely be staged at the same time. The experts... a number or some of the experts also recommended we split the hostage team, the new enhanced and... hostage rescue team, the new enhanced and larger one into 2 locations. Its based in Quantico in Virginia they suggested a western United States location too I've rejected that recommendation after talking to a number of people in the FBI on the ground that we want all 100 hostage rescue team members to train together, above all else. It also increases the cost very substantially of what is a very expensive operation but that would not have affected us if they didn't want them to train

34:33 The FBI negotiation capacity is a group of negotiators spread across the country, well trained but only one or two in Quantico. Mr Dennis described the situation in which sometimes the negotiators and the rescue people were working on different plans didn't understand each other worried about each other we need a larger component of negotiators in Quantico and they have to be trained with and working with the hostage rescue team. They are not two separate groups doing their own thing, they are part of what every modern western nation knows is a combined repertoire you need both third Mr Dennis noted that the FBI social science experts questioned whether in Waco our activities might not be playing into

35:34 the fantasies of David Koresh rather than fighting them, rather than helping deal with them in a way that would be more helpful. We need that social science expertise and we need training in Quantico and bringing it to bear along with the negotiators and the hostage rescue team. This is a difficult capacity to build incidentally. We don't want to be in the United States compiling files and building up knowledge on relatively unusual religious or political groups. But we have to be aware of differences, we have to train our agents to be aware of differences and we have to develop a list of people, an inventory, a bibliography that we can turn to when an event like this occurs. Academic experts who can be of help

36:35 The crisis management tradition, the fourth requirement. The crisis management tradition in the FBI has been to call on the local special agent in charge, the regional top person for the FBI We're talking about something too complicated, too difficult, too life-endangering for that. The FBI has decided and I strongly endorse that they will select 15 of their top special agents in charge send them to Quantico for special training, make them the pool of supervisors from whom we will call the next time such an event takes place. At that time we'll call on three or four of them this was also true in terms of numbers in Waco because uh... we have to have a capacity to deal twenty-four hours a day but these crisis managers will be trained

37:37 at Quantico with the hostage rescue team, with the negotiators with the social science. They are the conductors of what has to be a well-orchestrated response To the extent that time allows any major decision ought to be reviewed in FBI headquarters and here by the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General Again Mr Dennis was describing a very careful review process before putting tear gas into the Branch Davidian compound. That means that we should have people here, I think the FBI will use the assistant director in charge of criminal investigations and people-that's people at the FBI and People In Justice who have a continuing responsibility for maintaining the contact with the force, the team from Quantico that i'm describing here

38:39 the Attorney General and the Deputy Attorney General should have available to them somebody who will devote a great deal of time, a career prosecutor over a long period of time across administrations to handling the liaison here in those areas. Finally what about the other federal law enforcement agencies? As I said at the beginning there will be many hostages...I hope not too many but there will be hostage Rescue situations which are smaller scale. We will need SWAT teams, less fully trained but far more than the average law enforcement officer trained rescue operations we'll need those in our other agencies we'll need them to handle a situation before the FBI gets there to be of assistance after the FBI gets there if they can train as I recommend with the hostage rescue team

39:45 At Quantico, we're going to be able to make far more use of them and we're going to be able to expand the number of people that we can bring to bear on a situation such as this. Finally I think the FBI and Treasury should talk about the possibility of having other people besides simply FBI agents take part in this national team—this highly trained coordinated managed capacity to deal with situations of many well-armed people or many hostages. With that, let me bring in my friend and colleague Ron Noble the Assistant Secretary of Treasury for Enforcement Morning As you know the Treasury Department issued its retrospective report on September 30 1993 I answered questions with respect to that matter at that time

40:53 I'm here today with Deputy Attorney General Hyman in connection with the release of reports by nine of the forward-looking experts. Like Mr. Hyman, I want to praise the efforts of the experts and thank them for volunteering their time. The reports which were produced within a tight timetable provide a wealth of insight and useful ideas that will serve as a solid foundation upon which to build an improved law enforcement approach to situations like those that occurred near Waco I believe that the forward-looking process, which was convened by Treasury and Justice jointly should be an ongoing one. It can't simply end today as part of that ongoing process and after I and other Treasury law enforcement officials have reviewed the various reports released today i intend to issue a paper discussing The recommendations made by the experts and justice in identifying issues warranting further consideration

41:46 I hope that this paper will be viewed as a step in an ongoing process of reforming law enforcement. Although, I believe it is presently too early in the forward-looking process to recommend specific changes for federal law enforcement agencies' efforts to handle Waco like crises there are certain broad findings that can be made at this time and can serve as a framework for future recommendations First, with respect to the ATF raid the events uncovered that federal law enforcement lacks an effective system for ensuring that such ventures are undertaken only after appropriate consultation and proper planning and training. Any effort to address this deficiency must provide training for all levels of law enforcement from field agents through supervisors they must learn to recognize unconventional situations and know when to pursue them alone

42:42 when to handle them jointly, or when to refer them to better equipped entities. In addition I support the Deputy Attorney General's recommendation that we designate one entity develop expertise and lead all special law enforcement operations he defines such operations on page two of his report as those involving complex hostage slash barricade incidents for situations. The lead entity should be structured in staffed in a manner that will promote its use by all federal law enforcement agencies rather than cause turf battles over jurisdiction. Second, with respect to the siege the events show that even when all available federal law enforcement resources were brought to bear there remained much to be learned concerning integration of behavioral scientists and negotiators with a tactical commanders in the actual decision-making process

43:39 This situation was also evidenced by ATF's effort to execute its raid on the compound without first obtaining meaningful input from behavioral experts or other sources outside of ATF. To address this problem, improvements need to be made both in lead entities' decision-making process and the training of those participating in that process. The training efforts should emphasize how behavioral science can be used as a tool for understanding any nontraditional group including marginal religious sects Once sensitized to the value of behavioral science, agents will appear and in fact will be better equipped to request and rely on expert information during specific crisis situations. With respect to tactical decisions the input of behavioral scientists and negotiators must be structurally integrated into the decision-making process otherwise no matter how accurate their predictions

44:37 the behavioral scientist will not be able to influence the manner in which law enforcement conducts atypical and complex operations. In closing, I want to remind everyone that the greatest lesson we learned from the Waco tragedies is how difficult it is to resolve confrontations with groups such as the Branch Davidians once those groups have barricaded themselves Even if we instituted every recommendation made by every expert, we still could not guarantee a non-fatal resolution to future Waco like situations. This reality ought to be disturbing and unsettling to us all today and once in for all law enforcement must accept the fact that we cannot and ought not go it alone thank you

45:29 The floor is open for questions. I'll be the moderator and you'll see that i'm going to be sending them largely to Dennis or maybe to richard scruggs yes, sir in contrast to the treasury report There's no disciplinary action of any kind in this case even though mistakes were made according to mr.. Dennis Why is that? I have referred The reports that you got today and which have just been completed to the director of the FBI, Louis Freeh. The director will review them and he'll decide whether he believes any disciplinary action or any general instruction to do things differently are warranted but he has just received the reports and he is responsible for making those decisions

46:22 Considering the recommendations you made, if you had more rescuers, more negotiators, more scientific expertise, and more crisis managers is there any reason to believe the outcome could have been different? I'm not ducking that myself but i think you get a more refined answer if we ask Mr. Dennis at this time, not saying that you didn't do the best you could with what you had. The lack of that was seen as a problem. Mr Dennis describes the situation in which a group was pretty well resolved, or at least its leader was pretty well resolved on a suicidal outcome. In that situation I don't think that the capacities i've described are terribly helpful in other situations if we're dealing with the terrorist group and I have very much in the back of my mind terrorist groups the improved capacities i'm describing would be extremely helpful you can't

47:23 disclosed to us the actual transcript of these electronic interceptions, but I'm curious because of the placement where the deletions are in the report. It does appear that there is some evidence of a situation that was changing and that Koresh had reached the point where he was going to do something, and if that is indicated by your electronic interceptions. Is that so? I'm going to have to wait, I'm afraid you're gonna have to wait Nina for a release of those

48:01 tapes or transcripts or whatever they are and I hope that it's done at the earliest possible date. Good, when the ATF and Treasury Department issued their reports there were significant mea culpa involved there appear to be significant mea culpas wholly missing from this report Are you concerned, wholly missing from this report. Are you at all concerned that there may be a perception developed that this is more of a whitewash than an investigation? I have absolutely been concerned about that but i think that somehow or other i have a faith that you people, that you of the press and the american people will understand that when we go into a review of an event such as this

48:53 We have to be prepared to come out either with severe criticisms or if they're not justified, without severe criticisms. We can't come out with scapegoats when there's no severe blame to be placed." Now I do worry about it because it doesn't make a very good news story to say the expert for the Department of Justice Mr Ed Dennis says on the whole This was handled in a very responsible way. But on the other hand, I believe that we have a responsible enough press to take whatever way it comes out. You've got to take acquittals or convictions? Yes sir

49:36 I have a question really for Mr Dennis and it's following up on my colleague's question. There will be a perception, i think that this is a whitewash from the opening remarks of Mr Dennis talking about Mr Koresh's twisted mind and he used the word insane as well to page 63 where he says gassing the compound was his words, the only non-lethal means of resolving the crisis. Isn't the truth Mr Dennis or if you'd like to answer it too isn't the truth that the FBI after seven short weeks simply ran out of patience? First of all uh seven weeks is not a short period of time that's one of the things I tried to take a look at was um how the length of this particular standoff

50:28 related to other standoffs, at least in the experience of American law enforcement. I believe this is if not the longest, the second-longest standoff of its type. The only one that may have been longer was the one involving Wounded Knee. those outside the Bureau in my home state of Pennsylvania with regard to what they consider to be a lengthy standoff, hostage rescue type situation. I was told that most their situations are resolved within a day. A long period, a long standoff will be considered two or three days even for the hostage rescue team very long standoff would be a week

51:19 So 51 days is an extraordinary length of time. Second of all, The issue about what alternatives there were, could we have waited longer? Could we put the decision off? Might it have been different if it were 100 days rather than 50 days or 150 days rather than 100 days. That will probably be debated and that's an appropriate certainly appropriate issue to be addressed by those that have an interest in the subject. With regard to my characterization of Koresh I came into this without really much of an understanding of the details. I've listened to the negotiating tapes, seen Mr. Kresh on videotape. I've read medical examiner's reports. I stand by my characterization of it. Yes? Increasingly hostage rescue team now remember when the event first took place we were told that one of the factors

52:23 that went into the decision-making process was the weariness of the hostage rescue team on place and time. I haven't heard any reference to that so far today, and I don't know if you found that was a factor in dictating timing or not? And one other follow up question another thing we were told at that time is there were some concern about child abuse going on in the facility and that was also a factor and I haven't heard any reference to that can somebody address those two issues Although it's questionable that waiting longer would have changed the result, the fact that the standoff lasted as long as it did I think began to show some of the limitations of having one HRT.

53:12 The problem was that by maintaining one unit that could not be replaced, it did at least raise some concerns about the degradation of the security of maintaining that situation or maintaining the status quo. I think the thinking was that if there were a complement of 100, that it would allow one HRT to replace the other and therefore allow for if in a situation in which a more extended standoff might be called for or might be warranted. That would not be an issue

53:51 With regard to the issue of child abuse, clearly that was an issue from the beginning. Not just from the beginning and the standoff but from the beginning of the investigation As I learned as I went into the background of this, that claims of child abuse in part had fueled the interest of law enforcement even on the local level with regard to what was transpiring in the compound. A combination of that and the firearms offenses relatives who were concerned generated a record in which the issue of child abuse was clearly there

54:32 However, even though there was speculation at the time that somehow child abuse had been hyped by the FBI in an effort to win support for the tear gas plan. I found no evidence of that The Attorney General Did not find that that was the case and And so that in my mind, that was not an issue. Certainly concern about the children was paramount anyone who looks at this at all certainly myself included

55:10 finds themselves being taken by the fate of the children, concern about the children and it's difficult to... And one should not eliminate that from one's thinking. But I did not find that issue was inappropriately presented in so far as the way in which that fit into the overall decision-making process I still don't know. I got an answer where was the hostage rescue team matter Did that dictate the timing is that the reason the FBI? Wanted to move when it did or was that one of the factors that led the FBI to move on it It was raised as a factor in terms of the timing whether or not it affected the decision, or not I don't Believe so it was raised as a factorized raises a factor by really by the military

56:01 experts who came in to sort of give a second opinion. And so that was certainly raised expressly as an issue. I don't believe, however, that if there had been another HRT that could have spelled the HRT that was on the site that the decision would have been different in terms of the timing. Their level of concern is like yours raised thinking especially of those children if you would with no disrespect then allow me to ask You why is it that? It took the deaths of 50 adults and 25 children for the Justice Department To decide that maybe it ought to listen more closely to its own behavioral experts. I don't agree with that characterization Of what we found in this or what I've said in the report What my evaluation Is in this report

56:54 Clearly every situation is different. Every hostage rescue, barricade crisis situation is different all hostage rescue units Not just the federal ones, but as well as the ones in the states. One of the key components of their training is that after each of these events The situation is evaluated after action reports are prepared and there are attempts to learn from them so

57:29 so that even if the result had been more successful in the sense that it had resulted without bloodshed, there may still have been reasons to critique the way in which it was carried out. I think that's the way you expect law enforcement to be able to develop and evolve procedures that hopefully will be helpful in the future. Yes sir? Were the children all in one location? Was that location identified And if he had that information, did that influence your tactics or your decision to go ahead? Richard Scruggs might be able to I think an answer of that. He was focusing in on the medical examiner's reports which did set forth the placement of various corpses in the ruins

58:15 before the location of the children, before the incursion of the tanks into the compound. But Richard maybe you... I think i can answer all those questions first of all did law enforcement know specifically where in the compound the children were located prior to the insertion of gas? The evidence we determined was no they did not During the course of the insertion of the gas there was constant watch out by The people in the vehicle to your vehicles and by the people in the various observation posts trying to determine where the children were To the best we could determine that It would there was really no definitive word as at any time At all as to where the children were located only at one point

59:02 This was at approximately 12 o'clock, right before the fire. One of the armored vehicles went fairly deeply into the building and there's a bunker in the middle of the building if you've seen the photographs What we see here is its main tower facility right here in the middle, the taller portion that you have seen before Underneath that tower portion is a concrete bunker. What happened was the vehicle... What we saw then during the course of our inquiry was, the front side it's the side facing down as an armored vehicle went in very closely and tore